AWS IAM privilege escalation • iam:PassRole + datapipeline:CreatePipeline

iam:PassRole + Data Pipeline Privilege Escalation

AWS Data Pipeline runs activities on EC2 resources that assume a passed IAM role. With iam:PassRole plus datapipeline:CreatePipeline and PutPipelineDefinition, an attacker defines a pipeline that runs shell commands on a resource backed by a privileged role, then reads that role’s credentials.

Permissions an attacker needs

iam:PassRole
datapipeline:CreatePipeline
datapipeline:PutPipelineDefinition
datapipeline:ActivatePipeline

How the escalation works

The attacker picks a privileged role they are allowed to pass as the pipeline’s resource role.
They create and define a pipeline whose activity runs shell commands on an EC2 resource using that role.
They activate the pipeline; the commands run as the passed role, and its credentials can be exfiltrated.

Example vulnerable policy

A policy like this grants the dangerous permission. Paste your own policy into the free AI-Powered IAM analyzer to see if you are exposed.

{
  "Version": "2012-10-17",
  "Statement": [
    {
      "Effect": "Allow",
      "Action": [
        "iam:PassRole",
        "datapipeline:CreatePipeline",
        "datapipeline:PutPipelineDefinition",
        "datapipeline:ActivatePipeline"
      ],
      "Resource": "*"
    }
  ]
}

Example exploitation

For illustration only — run against accounts you own or are authorized to test.

aws datapipeline create-pipeline --name esc --unique-id esc
# then put-pipeline-definition with a ShellCommandActivity whose
# resourceRole is the privileged role, and activate-pipeline

How to detect and prevent it

Scope iam:PassRole to specific roles and add an iam:PassedToService condition for the pipeline resource role.
Restrict the datapipeline:* create/define/activate actions to the few teams that use Data Pipeline.
Prefer modern, least-privileged alternatives (Step Functions, Glue) with tightly scoped roles.

FAQ

Is Data Pipeline still common?

It is a legacy service, so many accounts never use it — but if the permissions are present in a broad policy, the escalation path is real. Removing unused datapipeline actions closes it entirely.

Related escalation methods

Check your IAM policies for this — free

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